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1 
Lecture 
The Role of Dissenting Opinions 
Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg† 
The remarks I have prepared concern the role of dissenting 
opinions in the U.S. judicial system generally, and the U.S. Su-
preme Court in particular. It is a subject I have had to think 
about more than occasionally in recent terms. 
Our Chief Justice, in his 2005 confirmation hearings, ex-
pressed admiration for the nation’s fourth Chief Justice, John 
Marshall—frontrunner for the title of greatest Chief Justice in 
U.S. history. Our current Chief admired, perhaps most of all, 
Chief Justice Marshall’s unparalleled ability to achieve consen-
sus among his colleagues. During his tenure, which ran from 
1801 until 1835, the Court spoke with one voice most of the 
time. Two contributors to Marshall’s success: in the early years 
of his tenure, all members of the Court resided and dined to-
gether in the same boarding house whenever the Justices con-
vened in the Capital City; and the Chief—sometimes after din-
ner followed by Madeira—volunteered to write most of the 
opinions. 
In Chief Justice Roberts’s first year at the helm, notably 
also Justice O’Connor’s last term on our bench, it appeared that 
the new Chief ’s hope for greater unanimity might be realized. 
In the 2005–2006 Term, forty-five percent of the cases we took 
up for review were decided unanimously, with but one opinion 
for the Court, and fifty-five percent were unanimous in the bot-
tom-line judgment.1 In the most recent term, 2008–2009, we 
slipped precipitously. With Justice O’Connor no longer at our 
conference table, the Court spoke with one voice in only nine-
teen percent (fifteen) of the term’s seventy-nine decisions, and 
 
†  Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. Presentation 
to the Harvard Club of Washington, D.C., on December 17, 2009. Copyright © 
2010 by Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 
 1. Statistics for the Supreme Court’s October Term 2005, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/archives/OpinionBreakdownFinal.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2010). 
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agreed unanimously in the bottom-line judgment in just under 
thirty-three percent (twenty-six) of the dispositions.2  
Typically, when Court decisions are announced from the 
bench, only the majority opinion is summarized. Separate opin-
ions, concurring or dissenting, are noted, but not described. A 
dissent presented orally therefore garners immediate attention. 
It signals that, in the dissenters’ view, the Court’s opinion is 
not just wrong, but grievously misguided. I will offer some ex-
amples in a short while.  
Our practice of revealing dissents, I should emphasize, is 
hardly universal. In the civil-law tradition that holds sway in 
Europe, and in countries once controlled by a continental pow-
er, courts—at least those in the regular court hierarchy—issue 
a collective judgment, cast in stylized, impersonal language. 
The author of the judgment is neither named nor otherwise 
identifiable. Disagreement, if it exists, as it sometimes does, is 
not disclosed. 
The British common-law tradition lies at the opposite pole. 
In appeals in that tradition, there was conventionally no “opin-
ion for the court” at all. Instead, the judges hearing the case 
composed their own individual opinions which, taken together, 
revealed the court’s disposition. Changes in British practice 
and in some European tribunals have brought these divergent 
systems closer together. The European Court of Human Rights 
seated in Strasbourg, for example, publishes signed dissenting 
opinions.3 And in some constitutional courts established abroad 
after World War II dissents are disclosed. But, by and large, 
the historical traditions hold.  
Our system occupies a middle ground between the conti-
nental and the historic British patterns. In the earliest days of 
our national existence, the U.S. Supreme Court, like its British 
counterpart, issued seriatim opinions. Each Justice spoke for 
himself whenever more than a memorandum judgment issued.4 
But John Marshall thought the “each-for-himself” practice ill-
advised.5 In its place, he established a new tradition of an-
 
 2. Statistics for the Supreme Court’s October Term 2008, SCOTUSBLOG 
(June 30, 2009), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/summary 
-memo-final.pdf. 
 3. M.D. Kirby, Judicial Dissent—Common Law and Civil Law Tradi-
tions, 123 L.Q. REV. 382, 395 (2007), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/ 
speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_06.pdf. 
 4. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 5. See Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A His-
tory of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 193 (1959). 
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nouncing judgments in a single opinion for the Court, which (as 
I earlier mentioned) he generally wrote himself. Opinions that 
speak for the Court remain the custom in the U.S. today. But 
unlike courts in civil-law systems, and in line with the British 
tradition, each member of the Court has the prerogative to 
write separately.  
What is right for one system and society may not be right 
for another. In civil-law systems, the nameless, stylized judg-
ment, and the disallowance of dissent are thought to foster the 
public’s perception of the law as dependably stable and secure. 
The common-law tradition, on the other hand, prizes the inde-
pendence of the individual judge to speak in his or her own 
voice, and the transparency of the judicial process. 
No doubt, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested in his confir-
mation hearings, the U.S. Supreme Court may attract greater 
deference, and provide clearer guidance, when it speaks with 
one voice. And I agree that a Justice, contemplating publication 
of a separate writing, should always ask herself: Is this dissent 
or concurrence really necessary? Consider the extra weight car-
ried by the Court’s unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of 
Education.6 In that case, all nine Justices signed one opinion 
making it clear that the Constitution does not tolerate legally 
enforced segregation in our Nation’s schools.7  
On the utility of dissenting opinions, I will mention first 
their in-house impact. My experience teaches that there is 
nothing better than an impressive dissent to lead the author of 
the majority opinion to refine and clarify her initial circulation. 
An illustration: the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) case, de-
cided by the Court in 1996, held that VMI’s denial of admission 
to women violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protec-
tion Clause.8 I was assigned to write the Court’s opinion. The 
final draft, released to the public, was ever so much better than 
my first, second, and at least a dozen more drafts, thanks to 
Justice Scalia’s attention-grabbing dissent. 
Sometimes a dissent is written, then buried by its author. 
An entire volume is devoted to the unpublished separate opin-
ions of Justice Louis Dembitz Brandeis.9 He would suppress his 
 
 6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 7. See Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Brown v. Board of Education in In-
ternational Context, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 493 (2005). 
 8. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 9. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE 
BRANDEIS (1957). 
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dissent if the majority made ameliorating alterations or, even 
when he gained no accommodations, if he thought the Court’s 
opinion was of limited application and unlikely to cause real 
harm in future cases. 
On occasion—not more than four times per term I would 
estimate—a dissent will be so persuasive that it attracts the 
votes necessary to become the opinion of the Court. I had the 
heady experience once of writing a dissent for myself and just 
one other Justice; in time, it became the opinion of the Court 
from which only three of my colleagues dissented. 
Are there lasting rifts sparked by sharply worded dissents? 
Justice Scalia spoke to that question nicely. He said: “I doubt 
whether any two [J]ustices have dissented from one another’s 
opinions any more regularly, or any more sharply, than did my 
former colleague Justice William Brennan and I. I always con-
sidered him, however, one of my best friends on the Court, and 
I think that feeling was reciprocated.”10 The same might be 
said today about my friendship with Justice Scalia. 
Describing the external impact of dissenting opinions, 
Chief Justice Hughes famously said: “A dissent in a Court of 
last resort is an appeal . . . to the intelligence of a future day, 
when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which 
the dissenting judge believes the court to have been be-
trayed.”11  
A classic example of an opinion “appealing to the intelli-
gence of a future day” is Justice Benjamin Curtis’s dissent from 
the Court’s now notorious 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford.12 The Court held, 7-2, in Dred Scott that people of African 
descent whose ancestors were brought to the United States as 
slaves could never become citizens of this country. Accordingly, 
an African American could not invoke a federal court’s diversi-
ty-of-citizenship jurisdiction in a free State to assert his free-
dom from slavery. Justice Curtis disagreed in an opinion re-
markable for its time. At the founding of our Nation, he wrote, 
African Americans were “citizens of at least five States, and so 
in every sense part of the people of the United States,” thus 
 
 10. Antonin Scalia, Dissents, 13 OAH MAG. HISTORY 18, 22 (1998), avail-
able at http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/judicial/scalia.html. 
 11. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. 
REV. 133, 144 (1990) (quoting CHARLES HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 68 (1936)). 
 12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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“among those for whom and whose posterity the Constitution 
was ordained and established.”13  
A further example is the first Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
the Civil Rights Cases.14 The Court, in that 1883 decision, in-
validated a federal law entitling “citizens of every race and col-
or” to the “full and equal enjoyment” of modes of transportation 
and places of public accommodation.15 If the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments are to be enforced “according to the 
intent with which . . . they were adopted,” Justice Harlan 
wrote, “there cannot be, in this republic, any class of human be-
ings in practical subjection to another class.”16  
Dissents of this order, Justice Scalia rightly commented, 
“augment rather than diminish the prestige of the Court.”17 He 
explained: “When history demonstrates that one of the Court’s 
decisions has been a truly horrendous mistake, it is comforting 
. . . to look back and realize that at least some of the [J]ustices 
saw the danger clearly and gave voice, often eloquent voice, to 
their concern.”18 
Though Justice Scalia would not agree with me in this fur-
ther example, I would place Justice Breyer’s 2007 dissent in the 
Seattle and Jefferson County, Kentucky school integration cas-
es in the same category.19 In those cases, the Court invalidated 
student assignment plans designed by city authorities to count-
er resegregation in the local public schools. The question was 
whether local communities had leeway to use race-conscious 
criteria to promote the kind of racially integrated education 
Brown v. Board anticipated. The Court held, 5-4, that the Con-
stitution prohibited the school boards’ efforts to prevent reseg-
regation. 
Justice Breyer’s comprehensive dissent concluded: “[T]he 
very school districts that once spurned integration now strive 
for it. . . . [T]hey have asked us not to take from their hands the 
instruments they have used to rid their schools of racial segre-
gation . . . . The last half-century has witnessed great strides 
towards racial equality, but we have not yet realized the prom-
 
 13. Id. at 582 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 14. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 15. Id. at 9. 
 16. Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 17. Scalia, supra note 10, at 19. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007). 
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ise of Brown. To invalidate the plans under review is to threat-
en [Brown’s promise] . . . . This is a decision . . . the Court and 
the Nation will come to regret.”20 
From the 2007–2008 term, I would rank as a dissenting 
opinion “appealing to the intelligence of a future day” the criti-
cisms Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer made of the Court’s 
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.21 The Heller majority 
held that the Second Amendment declares and shields the right 
to possess handguns in one’s home for self-defense. The dissen-
ters read the Amendment as establishing the right “to keep and 
bear Arms” only in connection with service to the Nation in the 
Militia.22 
Another genre of dissent aims to attract immediate public 
attention and, thereby, to propel legislative change. A fit exam-
ple, perhaps, is the dissent I summarized from the bench in 
2007 in Lilly Ledbetter’s case.23 Ledbetter worked as an area 
manager at a Goodyear tire plant in Alabama; in 1997, she was 
the only woman Goodyear employed in such a post.24 Her start-
ing salary (in 1979) was in line with the salaries of men per-
forming similar work. But over time, her pay slipped. By the 
end of 1997, there was a fifteen to forty percent disparity be-
tween Ledbetter’s pay and the salaries of her fifteen male coun-
terparts.25 A federal jury found it “more likely than not that 
[Goodyear] paid [Ledbetter] a[n] unequal salary because of her 
sex.”26 The Supreme Court nullified that verdict, holding that 
Ledbetter filed her claim too late. 
It was incumbent on Ledbetter, the Court said, to file 
charges of discrimination each time Goodyear failed to increase 
her salary commensurate with the salaries of her male peers. 
Any annual pay decision not contested promptly (within 180 
days), the Court ruled, became grandfathered, beyond the prov-
ince of Title VII (our principal law prohibiting employment dis-
crimination) ever to repair.  
The Court’s ruling, I observed for the four dissenters, ig-
nored real-world employment practices that Title VII was 
meant to govern: “Sue early on,” the majority counseled, when 
 
 20. Id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 21. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 22. Id. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 23. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 24. Id. at 643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 644. 
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it is uncertain whether discrimination accounts for the pay dis-
parity you are beginning to experience, and when you may not 
know that men are receiving more for the same work. (Of 
course, you would likely lose such a premature, less-than-fully-
baked challenge.) If you sue only when the pay disparity be-
comes steady and large enough to enable you to mount a win-
nable case, you will be cut off at the Court’s threshold for suing 
too late. That situation, I urged, could not be what Congress in-
tended when, in Title VII, it outlawed discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in our Nation’s 
workplaces. “[T]he ball is in Congress’ court,” I wrote, “to cor-
rect [the Supreme] Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”27  
Congress responded within days of the Court’s decision. 
Bills were introduced in the House and Senate to amend Title 
VII to make it plain that each paycheck a woman in Ledbetter’s 
situation received renewed the discrimination and restarted 
the time within which suit could be brought.28 Early in 2009, 
Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,29 and Presi-
dent Obama signed the corrective measure as one of his first 
actions after taking office. 
To sum up, although I appreciate the value of unanimous 
opinions, I will continue to speak in dissent when important 
matters are at stake. I stress important matters because I try 
to follow Justice Brandeis’s counsel. He cautioned that “in most 
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right.”30 One might put in that 
category an ambiguous provision of a complex statutory re-
gime—for example, the Internal Revenue Code or the Em-
ployees’ Retirement Income Security Act.  
On when to acquiesce in the majority’s view, and when to 
take an independent stand, John P. Frank wrote in 1958 of the 
model Brandeis set:  
Brandeis was a great institutional man. He realized that . . . random 
dissents . . . weaken the institutional impact of the Court and handi-
cap it in the doing of its fundamental job. Dissents . . . need to be 
saved for major matters if the Court is not to appear indecisive and 
quarrelsome . . . . To have discarded some of [his separate] opinions is 
a supreme example of [Brandeis’s] sacrifice to [the] strength and con-
 
 27. Id. at 661. 
 28. S. 1843, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 29. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). 
 30. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
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sistency of the Court. And he ha[d] his reward: his shots [were] all the 
harder because he chose his ground.31 
In the years I am privileged to serve on the Court, I hope I 
will be granted similar wisdom in choosing my ground. 
 
 31. John P. Frank, Book Review, 10 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401, 404 (1958) (re-
viewing BICKEL, supra note 9). 
